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International human rights regimes in Latin America: 
the commitment and compliance gap
Alejandro Anaya-Muñoz
Has the international human rights regime made a difference in practice? This article offers a pre-
liminary approach to this question, focusing on Latin America. In particular, the article highlights the 
tensions between commitment and compliance with international human rights norms in the region. The 
article demonstrates that Latin-American countries have shown a strong commitment with these norms 
and with the organs of the universal and Inter-American human rights regimes. The article stresses, 
however, that high commitment has not been followed by a meaning ful improvement in human rights 
conditions on the ground; therefore showing a clear gap between rights “in principle” and rights “in 
practice” in the region. The article concludes with an exploratory discussion on the possible causes for 
this decoupling and suggests future lines of research.
Introduction
For the past seven decades, the international community has developed a 
dense network of international norms and organs for the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights. This institutional infrastructure conforms what the 
International Relations literature would call an “international regime”—a set 
of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, established by 
states to regulate or constitute their interaction within a specific issue-area of 
international relations1. During the past twenty-five years or so, social scien-
tists have traced the emergence and development of this international regime, 
investigating whether and why states make formal, binding commitments with 
it and, particularly, whether the regime has made a difference in practice. In 
this latter respect, the key question is if the international human rights re-
1  This is the “consensus definition”, originally developed by Stephen Krasner (1983). See also 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997: 8-22; Donnelly 1986: 599-605. For a description of  
the international human rights regime see Sepúlveda et al. 2004; Martín, Rodríguez-Pinzón 
and Guevara 2004; Steiner, Alston and Goodman 2008.
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gime has had an influence on the behavior of states—in other words, whether, 
after the adoption of binding commitments with international norms, states 
comply with them or with the decisions by the organs of the regime. This 
article offers a preliminary (mainly descriptive) approach to such questions, 
focusing the United Nations (UN) and Inter-American human rights regimes 
in the case of Latin American countries2. Have these countries adopted bind-
ing commitments with the international human rights regime? Have these 
commitments been followed by compliance—that is, by an improved human 
rights behavior in practice? These are the main questions that this article ad-
dresses, in a preliminary and exploratory fashion.
Latin America has been a “case study” favored by the International Rela-
tions and Comparative Politics literature that focus on human rights (Brysk 
1993 and 1994; Sikkink 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Franklin 2007; Card-
enas 2007; Burgerman 2011; Hawkins 2002; Anaya Muñoz 2009). In part 
for the support and reliance on international law in general by the region’s 
countries and for their contribution to the development of international hu-
man rights norms and institutions (Forysthe 1991; Macaulay 2010: 136). Also, 
as this article will show, because Latin American countries have expressed 
in different ways—notably through the swift and generalized ratification of 
international human rights treaties—a commitment with international hu-
man rights norms, which begs the questions of why they are so prone to make 
commitments in the first place and whether this has been followed by com-
pliance. Furthermore, the region’s states are democratizing countries which 
during the past few decades have aspired to be accepted as members of the 
community of democratic and rights-respecting nations, which makes them 
“socially vulnerable” and therefore more likely to be persuaded or pressured 
to comply (Risse and Sikkink 2013, 20-22). So Latin America, as a region, 
might be considered as a “most likely” case in the study of the influence of the 
international human rights regime or in the difficult transition from commit-
ment to compliance.
The article is organized as follows. The first section describes the main 
functions of the organs and procedures of the UN and Inter-American human 
rights regimes—the key tools they have to attempt to influence states’ behav-
ior. The second traces the level of commitment of Latin American countries 
with the regime’s norms and organs. In the third section, the article looks at 
their record of compliance. On these bases, it identifies a clear gap between 
2  The article only looks at the 18 Latin American countries from the continental mainland—
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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commitment and compliance—while the countries of the Latin American 
region have been exemplary in terms of the ratification of human rights trea-
ties and the recognition of the international human rights regime’s organs and 
bodies, they have continued to violate human rights in practice. The article 
concludes with an exploratory discussion on the possible causes for this gap 
and suggests future lines of research. 
1. The Universal and Inter-American human rights regimes
As already mentioned, an international regime is comprised by a specific set 
of principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures or organs. The 
principles of the international human rights regime are established in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the normative bed-
rock of the international human rights regime. The UDHR enshrines the 
principles of equality in rights and dignity of every human being, “without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” 
(UDHR, article 2). Furthermore, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program 
of Action stresses this principle of universality and adds those of indivisibil-
ity, interdependency and interrelatedness of human rights (Viena Declara-
tion and Program of Action, Paragraph 5). The UDHR and a large list of 
subsequent international human rights treaties and declarations contain the 
regime’s norms and rules—a broad catalogue of rights and obligations and 
prescriptions and proscriptions for action. Individuals and, sometimes, collec-
tive entities such as minorities and indigenous peoples, are the right holders, 
whereas obligations and prescriptions and proscriptions are assigned to states. 
This is of course a key difference between the international human rights 
regime and other international regimes, in which states are the rights hold-
ers and duty-bearers. The UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and other international organizations (i.e. the Coun-
cil of Europe and the African Union), together with a long list of human rights 
treaties establish the “decision making procedures” of the regimes—organs 
and procedures that monitor the implementation of norms and rules and that 
determine whether states have complied or not. 
The international human rights regime is conformed by several particular 
or specific regimes—the “universal” (UN-based), the Inter-American, Euro-
pean and African regimes3. The principles of these regimes are the broadly 
3  The universal, European, Inter-American and African human rights regimes are the existing 
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same, and the norms and rules are similar, with only some regional variation. 
However, each of these regimes has been established by different internation-
al organizations (and therefore is in force in respect to specific groups of states) 
and each relies on its own treaties and organs. As already mentioned, this 
article focuses on the regimes that are in force for Latin American states—the 
universal and Inter-American regimes. Table 1 shows the treaties and organs 
for these two regimes.
Table 1. Main international legal instruments and organs of the UN and Inter-American human 
rights regimes
Regime International legal instruments International organs
UN (or universal) regime UN CharterUniversal Declaration of Human Rights
Human Rights Council (formerly 
Human Rights Commission)
International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination
Committee of the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (18 independent 
experts)
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
Human Rights Committee (18 
independent experts)
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights
Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (18 independent 
experts
Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women
Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (23 
independent experts)
Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment
Committee against Torture (10 
independent experts)
Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture 
(25 independent experts)
Convention on the Rights of the Child Committee on the Rights of the Child (18 independent experts)
International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their 
Families
Committee on Migrant Workers (10 
independent experts)
regimes that have a higher level of  institutional density or “legalization” (Abbott et al. 2000). 
There are, however, more recent and less developed attempts to create a framework of  interna-
tional human rights organs and norms by other regional organizations, such as the Middle East 
and Southeast of  Asia, or even in cultural “spaces” such as the Islamic world. 
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Regime International legal instruments International organs
Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities
Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (18 independent 
experts)
International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance
Committee on Enforced 




American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man
American Convention on Human 
Rights
Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture
Protocol of San Salvador: Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Convention of Belem do Pará: 
Inter-American Convention on 
the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women
Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons
Inter-American Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Person with 
Disabilities
Inter-American Convention Against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, and 
Related Forms of Intolerance
Inter-American Convention Against 
All Forms of Discrimination and 
Intolerance
Inter-American Convention on 
Protecting the Human Rights of Older 
Persons
Source: Made by author.
The universal regime gravitates around two types and sets of organs and 
therefore follows two different dynamics—charter-based organs and treaty 
bodies. That is, on the one hand, the regime rests on the UN Human Rights 
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Council (HR Council), which substituted the Human Rights Commission 
(HR Commission) in 2006 and, on the other, on the ten bodies or committees 
mentioned in Table 14. 
The HR Council is made-up of government representatives, which be-
gets the problem of politicization—the national interest tends to interfere in 
the promotion and protection of human rights (Lauren 2007). This does not 
necessarily mean that the actual situation of violation of human rights in a 
country is irrelevant for the decision-making process of the HR Council. Re-
search has demonstrated, for example, that even the highly politicized HR 
Commission did take into account the actual level of human rights violations 
when adopting critical resolutions against a country, particularly after the end 
of the Cold War (Lebovic and Voeten 2006: 861-888).
The HR Council has primarily a monitoring function—that is, it can fol-
low and assess the human rights situation within countries. A fundamental 
mechanism for this are its “special procedures”—special rapporteurs, work-
ing groups and similar mandates, established to investigate and report on the 
human rights situation in specific countries or around particular human rights 
issues. These country or thematic mandates are entrusted to “independent ex-
perts” who, in principle, serve on their “personal capacity” and do not repre-
sent any government. Treaty bodies are also formed by independent experts. 
This suggests that treaty bodies and the HR Council’s special procedures can 
monitor compliance and protect human rights more objectively than the po-
liticized, diplomat-run HR Council as such (cf. Lauren 2007; Anaya Muñoz 
2014: 75-78). This intuition, however, has not been explored empirically in an 
explicit and systematic way by the literature.
In addition to its special procedures, the HR Council can monitor the 
compliance with human rights norms by countries through different mecha-
nisms—the consideration of complaints on grave violations of human rights 
submitted through its confidential procedure; adopting critical resolutions on 
country situations, and most notably the recently established Universal Peri-
odic Review (UPR). The UPR has the unique characteristic of monitoring 
the human rights situation in all UN Member states in a periodic fashion, 
as its own name suggests. In this way, it has responded to criticisms of selec-
tivity and double standards that were addressed against its predecessor, the 
HR Commission. In any case, as a result of its monitoring activities, the HR 
Council can only issue recommendations and has no enforcement capacity—
its decisions are not legally binding and it cannot establish sanctions, let alone 
4  The Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture established the UN Subcommitte 
on the Prevention of  Torture, which is also considered a treaty body.
159INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA
use force to make states comply5. Monitoring, nevertheless, can unleash a pro-
cess of “shaming” that, under certain conditions, can persuade countries into 
improving its compliance (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
1999 and 2013; Hafner-Burton 2008; Davis and Murdie 2012).
Treaty bodies can also attempt to induce compliance through monitoring—
particularly through the revision of periodic reports by states and the elabora-
tion of special in-depth investigations on specific situations of grave or severe vi-
olations of human rights6. In addition, treaty bodies have a quasi-jurisdictional 
function to receive and consider individual communications or complaints, in 
which they determine authoritatively whether the accused state has in fact vio-
lated specific dispositions of international human rights treaties7. Just as the HR 
Council and its special procedures, the treaties bodies can only make recom-
mendations, which are non-binding to states; even in its decisions (“views”) on 
individual communications. Yet again, these organs do not have enforcement 
capacity and can only aspire to “shame” countries into complying.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is made-up 
of seven independent experts that serve in their individual capacity, while the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACoHR) is conformed by the same 
number of judges, who also do not represent their countries (Anaya Muñoz 
2014: 79-84). The central functions of the IACHR are to monitor the human 
rights situation in the Western Hemisphere through the elaboration of special 
reports. Like the treaty bodies of the UN, it also has a quasi-jurisdictional 
protection function, through the consideration of individual petitions or com-
plaints. Again, the IACHR can only issue recommendations, even in the case 
of adopting decisions in specific cases. Only the IACoHR can adopt binding 
decisions through its sentences or rulings. States have the legal obligation to 
implement the remedies mandated in the Court’s rulings. Nevertheless, nei-
ther the IACHR nor the IACoHR have enforcement powers.
5  As the reader would recall, only the Security Council of  the UN has coercive capacities, 
acting under Chapter VII of  the organization’s Charter.
6  Treaty bodies can also adopt “general comments”, through which they clarify or develop the 
content of  the human rights enshrined in each treaty. Likewise, most of  them can receive state 
communications—complaint by one state regarding the violation of  human rights by other 
state. This latter function, however, has not been used in practice.
7  This competence is not activated automatically after the ratification of  the treaty. Its reco-
gnition is optional for the states party to each treaty. It is usually adopted through a special 
declaration or the ratification of  a special protocol. In the case of  the Committee of  Migrant 
Workers Rights, the individual communication mechanism has not become effective, because 
it does not yet have the minimum number of  declarations by states party to the Convention 
regarding the acceptance of  this competence.
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In sum through monitoring and the quasi-jurisdictional and jurisdictional 
adjudication of specific cases of human rights violations, the organs of the 
UN and Inter-American human rights regimes can authoritatively establish 
whether states comply or not. But as already stressed, they lack enforcement 
powers—they cannot force states to comply with norms and/or implement 
their decisions. These international regimes seem to be “teeth-less”. Their 
principal tool is to “name and shame”—through their critical evaluations and 
their recommendations and rulings, these organs can demonstrate and pub-
licize the lack of compliance by states (Anaya Muñoz 2014: 63-97). If we as-
sume that international human rights norms are highly demanding—that is, 
they are difficult to put in practice, particularly for states that have been used 
for a long time to recur to repression—then the outlook for compliance does 
not seem promising in the first place.
2. Commitment with international human rights norms in Latin America
The aggregated global level of ratification of most international human rights 
treaties is very high. This indicates an equally high level of commitment with 
international human rights norms. Table 2 shows that, with the exception of 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted since 1990) and the Inter-
national Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance (adopted in 2010), the rest of the treaties have been ratified by a 
majority of states. If we trace long-term, aggregated ratification tendencies, 
we will find a consistently increasing number of treaties ratified by a growing 
number of states. Graph 1 suggests an expanding commitment with interna-
tional human rights norms.
Graph 2 presents a very similar picture for Latin America—a consistently 
growing commitment with international human rights norms. This is also 
shown in Graph 3, which shows the number of treaties that each Latin Ameri-
can country has ratified up to 2017. As can be seen, with the exception of Be-
lize (which has not assumed commitments with the Inter-American regime), 
most states of the region have ratified most of the human rights treaties that 
the region’s countries can ratify8.
Another way to observe the commitment with international human rights 
regimes is to explore up to what point states have recognized the compe-
tence or jurisdiction of international organs to consider and decide upon 
8  For the list of  these treaties see Table 1, supra. 
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Table 2. Human rights treaties adopted in the framework of the UN. Number of ratifications 
(Global)
Treaty Year of adoption
Number of 
ratifications
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 178
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 169
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 165
Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 189
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984 161
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 196
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families 1990 50
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 172
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance 2006 55
Source: Made by author. Updated until November 2017.

























































































Source: Made by author. Updated up to November 2017.
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Source: made by the author. Updated until November 2017.















































































Source: made by the author. Updated until November 2017.
Note: Venezuela ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights in 1977, 
however, it denounced this treaty on September 10, 2012 (this became effective a 
year later).
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specific complaints of the violation of human rights. The acceptance of the 
competence of the UN treaty bodies to receive individual communications or 
petitions and the jurisdiction of the IACoHR is optional for states that had 
ratified the UN or OAS human rights treaties. If we consider this faculty as 
highly intrusive, in the sense that it implies an authoritative and (in the case 
of the IACoHR) binding determination on the violation of norms in specific 
cases, then states that have accepted this faculty demonstrate an even higher 
commitment with international human rights regimes.
Graph 4 shows the acceptance by the region’s countries of the competence 
of UN treaty bodies to receive individual communications. The variation be-
tween countries is important, but the overall regional level of commitment 
remains moderately high.















































































Source: Made by author. Updated until November 2017.
All the Latin American continental states (again, with the exception of 
Belize) have recognized the jurisdiction of the IACoHR, although in very dif-
ferent moments in time—some states did so since the early 1980s, while others 
did so twenty years later (See Table 3). Beyond this time variations, Table 3 
also shows a strong commitment of Latin American states with the regional 
human rights regime.
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Table 3. Recognition of the jurisdiction of the IACoHR 
Argentina 1984

















Source: Made by the author. 
*Note: Venezuela denounced the American Convention on Human Rights on Sep-
tember 10, 2012 (this became effective a year later). 
Venezuela recently denounced the ACHR, therefore eliminating the ju-
risdiction of the IACoHR. This shows a decline in Venezuela’s commitment 
to the regime’s norms and organs. Similarly, several South American states, 
notably Ecuador, recently showed strong disapproval of the IACHR and pro-
moted a process of diplomatic discussion within the OAS, which aimed at re-
ducing the powers of the Commission. This attempt to undermine the Com-
mission was thwarted, to a large degree due to the defense of the IACHR by 
other members of the OAS, such as Mexico and Colombia9. More recently, 
the IACHR faced a severe budget crisis and even otherwise highly supportive 
partners, such as Mexico, had important misgivings regarding the IACHR 
and its work. These tensions between states and the organs of the Inter-Amer-
9  See the different contributions in the Journal Pensamiento Propio, No. 38, 2013.
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ican human rights regime suggest the possible erosion of the commitment to 
the regime in the region. However, most Latin American states continue to 
be party to a majority of human rights treaties and to accept the competence 
or jurisdiction of many international human rights organs10. By and large, 
the commitment with international norms and organs remains significantly 
strong in the region11. This begs the question, however, of whether this strong 
commitment has led to greater compliance. 
3. Compliance with international human rights norms in Latin America
An important problem in the development of a research agenda on the com-
pliance with international human rights norms is the lack of comprehensive, 
comparable and reliable data (Sinyuan 2013: 85-102). However, different 
measuring efforts offer proxy indicators that have allowed a growing number 
of researchers to address the compliance question from a quantitative perspec-
tive12. One of the most widely used data are those produced by the Cingranelli 
and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI) (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 
2014) 13. Following a well-designed and systematic codification of the informa-
tion contained in the annual human rights reports by the US State Depart-
ment and Amnesty International, the CIRI indicators and indexes depict, 
in an ordinal scale, levels of respect/violation of different human rights, in a 
country/year format (from 1981 to 2011). Looking at CIRI’s indexes on physi-
cal integrity rights (the prohibition of extrajudicial executions, torture, en-
forced disappearances and political imprisonment) and empowerment rights 
(freedom of domestic and foreign movement, freedom of association, freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, workers’ 
rights and electoral self-determination), we can have an initial empirical look 
10  Trinidad and Tobago was the first OAS member to denounce the ACHR, in 1998. The 
same year, it also denounced the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which enables the Human Rights Committee to consider individual com-
munications (complaints) regarding specific cases of  the violation of  human rights. This was 
after Jamaica had denounced the First Optional Protocol, in 1997. Guyana also denounced 
the Protocol in 1998. Both Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago re-acceded to the First Optio-
nal Protocol, but including a reservation precluding the consideration by the Human Rights 
Committee of  cases related to the imposition of  the death penalty. See Amnesty International, 
“Unacceptably Limiting Human Rights Protection”, AMR 05/01/99, March 1999. 
11  This commitment is not as strong in other regions of  the world. See Landman 2005: 67-70.
12  This literature is very large. For reviews see Dai 2013.
13  Unfortunately, this project of  generating indicators has been recently canceled. Data is avai-
lable until 2011. Other options are: The Political Terror Scale and Freedom House.
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at the compliance question in Latin America. The physical integrity rights 
index ranges from 0 to 8 points—0 reflecting the highest level of violation and 
8 the highest level of respect for these rights—and the empowerment rights 
index from 0 to 14—again, 0 representing the highest level of violations and 
14 the highest level of respect14.
In Graph 5 we can observe that the average global indexes of physical in-
tegrity rights and empowerment rights has only varied marginally form 1981 
to 2011. This could suggest that, after intense ratification, or in other words 
after enthusiastic and growing commitment, compliance has not changed in 
practice at the global, aggregated level. 









1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Physical Integrity Rights. World average 1981-2011
New Empowerment Rights. World Average 1981-2011
Source: Made by author with data from Cingranelli, Richards and Clay 2014.
Note: Data available only until 2011.
As shown in Graph 6, the aggregated picture for Latin America is very 
similar to the global image shown in Graph 5. The situation of physical integ-
14  See http://humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html. The CIRI data base offers 
two indexes of  empowerment rights: the “old empowerment rights index” and the “new em-
powerment rights index”. This article uses the second one.
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rity and empowerment rights has improved marginally in the region during 
the past 30 years. If we compare the trends shown in both graphs we can 
observe clearly a commitment-compliance gap, both globally and in Latin-
America—states have adopted growing commitments with international hu-
man rights norms but only marginally improved their behavior.










1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Latin American states Physical Integrity Rights Index Average
Latin American States New Empowerment Rights Index Average
Source: Made by author with data from Cingranelli, Richards and Clay 2014. 
Note: Data available only until 2011.
Beyond this simplistic descriptive approach, using ever more sophisticated 
statistical techniques, an increasing number of scholars have explored the co-
variation between the adoption of normative commitments (through the rati-
fication of treaties) and the levels of violation or respect of, particularly, physi-
cal integrity rights15. A first set of studies did not find a positive correlation 
15  It is not clear why most of  the authors have not been interested in exploring empowerment 
rights.
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between treaty ratification and human rights behavior, as measured by indi-
cators such as those of CIRI, the Political Terror Scale (PTS)16 or Freedom 
House17. Even worse, these early studies found a negative correlation—states 
seemed to violate more some human rights after ratifying international trea-
ties. A pioneer author explained this odd and discouraging finding as strategic 
behavior by states—ratification implies low sovereignty costs (because, as al-
ready stressed here, international human rights regimes do not have coercive 
powers) and it generates important legitimacy benefits. In this way, ratifica-
tion could be seen as a highly attractive strategy, particularly for repressive 
governments that have no intention of changing their behavior in practice 
(Hathway 2002: 1835-2042). Other, more optimistic, authors talked of “the 
paradox of empty promises”—even if ratification in itself does not correlate 
with an improved human rights behavior by states, it increased the normative 
tools available for domestic advocates to try to protect human rights against 
their repressive governments (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005: 1373-1411). 
As we will see, this effect of empowering domestic actors seems to be the key 
contribution of international human rights regimes.
Other studies did find a positive, even if moderate, positive impact of ratifi-
cation on human rights practices; particularly in the case of democratic states 
with a strong judiciary (Landman 2005). Other authors have found that the 
scope conditions for this positive impact are, in addition to having a demo-
cratic form of government, the presence of a transnationalized civil society in 
the country. Whereas, on the contrary, the ratification would have no effect 
(or even negative effects) in autocratic countries that do not have a strong civil 
society with international connections (Neumeyer 2005: 925-953). Finally, in 
what probably is the most sophisticated and convincing study on the matter, 
Beth Simmons corroborated that treaty ratification does have a positive influ-
ence on human rights behavior by states, particularly in the case of democ-
ratizing countries (or democracies “in flux”) that have a strong civil society 
that mobilizes and litigates in favor of human rights (Simmons 2009; Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2005: 1373-1411; Neumeyer 2005: 925-933). In this kind 
of democracies, advocates from civil society have both the incentives and the 
political space to mobilize and litigate in favor of the protection of human 
rights and their chances of success improve precisely because of the impact of 
ratification over domestic politics (Simmons 2009). In such contexts, the criti-
cal monitoring of the human rights behavior of states by the organs of the UN 
and Inter-American human rights regimes and the “shaming” effect they have 
16  See www.politicalterrorscale.org
17  See https://freedomhouse.org/
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turns particularly useful for those empowered local actors that seek to influ-
ence the behavior of their own governments. Most Latin-American countries 
are democracies in flux, in which we observe these processes of internal mobi-
lization and litigation in favor of human rights. In this sense, Latin-America 
should be a region in which commitment should be more likely to evolve into 
compliance. As suggested here, however, this has not been the case.
Another way of evaluating compliance with international human rights 
norms is to observe the implementation of recommendations or binding rem-
edies adopted by the organs of international human rights regimes. As al-
ready stressed above, the regimes’ organs critically monitor the general situ-
ation of countries (their compliance with the norms and rules enshrined in 
international human rights legal instruments) and adjudicate on specific cases 
of alleged violations of human rights. The outcome of these monitoring and 
protection functions is the elaboration recommendations or the adoption of 
(in theory, legally binding) reparation measures or remedies. Through these 
recommendations and reparations, the organs of international human rights 
regimes recommend or require states to take a set of concrete actions. To what 
extent do states implement or put into practice these recommendations or 
remedies? In other words, to what extent do states follow the decisions taken 
by the very international organs the have committed with?
The literature that has explored this type of questions is not as abundant as 
the one that traces correlations between treaty ratification and human rights 
behavior. However, existing studies show that the implementation of the de-
cisions of the organs of international human rights regimes is very limited 
(Open Society Initiative 2010; Basch et al. 2010: 9-35; Huneeus 2011: 102-
155). In the terms of one of these studies, “an implementation crisis currently 
afflicts the regional and international legal bodies charged with protecting 
human rights” (Open Society Initiative 2010: 11). 
In the case of the organs of the Inter-American human rights regime, the 
level of implementation of the recommendations of the IACHR and the repa-
rations ordered by the IACoHR is very poor18. One of these studies found 
that until 2008, only 12.5% of the IACHR’s recommendations had been com-
pletely implemented, while 69.5% of them had been partially implemented, 
and 18% had not been implemented at all. Until 2010, only 6% of the 126 
rulings adopted by the IACoHR had been completely implemented; 61% had 
been implemented partially and the rest had not been implemented at all 
(Open Society Initiative: 2010). It’s not surprising, on the other hand, that 
18  For a discussion on the differences between implementation and compliance see Open SO-
ciety initiative 2010: 13.
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA170
states comply more with certain types of measures—i.e. those related to the 
payment of monetary compensation—while they do not comply with oth-
ers—i.e. those that establish legal reforms or the investigation, prosecution 
and punishment of those responsible for the violation of rights (Open Society 
Initiative 2010: 65-70). Similarly, Alexandra Huneeus finds that compliance is 
higher in the case of recommendations and remedies addressed at the execu-
tive branch, and close to zero in those directed at judicial authorities (Huneeus 
2011: 102-155). This is a very important caveat that helps us understand bet-
ter the compliance challenge—federal executive branches are directly and 
intensively exposed to the interaction with the organs of international hu-
man rights regimes and other actors that exert human rights pressure “from 
above” (Brysk 1994). Subnational governments and judicial and legislative 
branches are not exposed to these dynamics, and if we grant that very often 
human rights violations take place far away from national capitals, this is a 
clear challenge for the organs of the international human rights regime and 
other advocates if they seek to advance compliance more efficiently.
Final remarks. A possible route for compliance?
This article focuses on the international human rights regimes in force in 
Latin America. Beyond describing some of the key features of the regimes, 
the article describes the levels of commitment, contrasting them with those 
of compliance in the region. The international normative and institution-
al structure for human rights is highly dense and legitimate in the region. 
However, such a highly institutionalized setting does not result in an evident 
improvement in human rights practices. States have created, developed and 
committed to human rights norms and institutions. However, they continue 
their business as usual, exercising power recurring to the violation of human 
rights. Of course, this article does not offer an analysis that can lead to the 
identification of causal relationships between the poor compliance record in 
the region and different possible independent variables. Nevertheless, the ex-
panding International Relations and Comparative Politics literature on hu-
man rights suggests several possibilities. As already mentioned, the literature 
argues that the dynamics generated by the adoption of international human 
rights commitments are more likely to have influence over democracies “in 
flux”. It also stresses the importance of the existence of a strong civil society, 
with active and intense transnational links. At first glance, this does not seem 
to be at the heart of the compliance problem in Latin America—all the coun-
tries continue to struggle to develop strong, consolidated democracies and in 
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most if not all of them civil society organizations have a long history of activ-
ism and significant transnational ties. Why is it, then, that the countries from 
Latin America do not improve their human rights behavior, even under such 
propitious conditions? The literature has identified three factors that nega-
tively affect human rights—armed conflict, the existence of “pro-violation 
constituencies” and limited state capacities, all of which seem to be endemic to 
the region. The correlation between armed conflict and human rights viola-
tions is strong (Cardenas 2007; Shor 2008: 803-826). It is not hard to imagine 
why this is the case. In itself, the logic of war—be it international or domes-
tic—or armed conflict, in general, is inherently detrimental to human rights, 
particularly physical integrity rights. Executions, torture and disappearances 
are prone to proliferate in the midst of armed conflict. The history of internal 
armed conflicts in the region from the 1970s to the 1990s is well known, as is 
the more recent “drug war”, currently affecting Mexico and Central Amer-
ica in a particularly devastating way. Armed conflict and armed violence in 
general seem to be a key element affecting human rights outcomes in the 
region and therefore preventing compliance to move forward. On the other 
hand, long-standing economic and political interests and public security crisis 
(linked of course to armed conflicts and drug wars) give rise to pro-violation 
constituencies—powerful domestic groups that demand that their privileges 
are sustained, if necessary through the use of repression, or large sectors of 
society that demand security “at any costs”. Under such a scenario, “mano 
dura” (strong fist) policies are prone to emerge (Cavallaro and Mohamedeu 
2005: 139-165). If the organs of the international human rights regime and 
domestic and transnational advocates demand the respect of human rights, 
these powerful and influential groups demand the opposite. Hence, another 
highly likely factor that is precluding compliance in the region. Governments 
thus face opposing demands. Ideologically inspired domestic armed conflicts 
are no longer present in the region; but drug wars and militarized responses 
to security crisis have taken their place. Interest groups are not likely to re-
nounce their privileges easily (most likely they will try to expand them) and 
people will tend to have a strong preference for security in the context of high 
criminality, even if that affects the rights of “somebody else”. The panorama 
for the future of human rights is therefore bleak for Latin America. 
Institutional capacity, to conclude, has recently emerged as a key variable 
within the scholarly discussions on human rights compliance (Risse and Ropp 
2013; Börzel and Risse 2013; Krasner and Risse 2014; Englehart 2009; Zhou 
2012). Central authorities that might want to pursue a human rights agenda 
will have a hard time changing entrenched practices or affecting powerful 
interests if they cannot count on strong institutions, particularly in the justice 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA172
sector. This is important, even if one considers that often political elites in 
Latin America are not willing to pursue human rights change. 
In sum, armed conflict, pro-violation constituencies and feeble state in-
stitutions might be at the heart of the compliance deficit in Latin America; 
together with the predominance of political elites that do not have a strong 
interest or preference for human rights in the first place. Future research will 
have to take these variables into account, when attempting to explain the 
compliance gap in the region.
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